On February 12, 1960, the Conseil d’État ruled on two applications brought by Eky, a company challenging offences created by decree for the use of counterfeit means of payment. The decision handed down by its Litigation Section raises two separate questions: Is the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution binding on the administration?
And, more importantly, is it the legislature or the regulatory authority that sets penalties for minor offences? The Conseil d’État’s answer settles both questions, but not in the way it is usually understood.
The division between statute and regulation in criminal law: what the Eky judgment actually decides
Common interpretations of the judgment focus on its recognition of the Preamble’s legal force. That interpretation is correct, but it overlooks the decision’s central reasoning. The Conseil d’État applies Articles 34 and 37 of the Constitution to determine whether creating minor offences falls within the legislative domain or the regulatory authority’s remit.
The outcome is clear: minor offences fall within the regulatory authority’s remit, and Article 4 of the former Criminal Code, which reserved the setting of penalties for such offences to statute, is deemed to have been repealed by the new constitutional division of powers. The Conseil d’État therefore upholds the contested decree.
This solution creates tension with Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which states that no one may be punished except under a law.
By accepting that the executive may create minor offences by regulation, the Conseil d’État allows an exception to the principle of legality in criminal law as formulated in 1789. A closer analysis of the 1960 Eky judgment reveals that the decision primarily defines the boundary between the legislative domain and the regulatory authority.

Preamble to the 1958 Constitution: the Conseil d’État recognizes its legal force
The decision’s second contribution concerns the status of the Preamble. Before 1960, uncertainty remained about its binding force. Some legal scholars viewed it as a declaratory text with no direct effect on administrative acts.
By assessing the contested decree against Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration, the Conseil d’État recognizes that the texts referenced by the Preamble constitute legal rules enforceable against the administration. The 1958 Preamble refers to the 1789 Declaration and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution: these texts form part of the body of law against which the administrative courts review administrative action.
The scope of this recognition remains limited to the review of administrative acts. The Conseil d’État does not review the constitutionality of statutes. The distinction is fundamental: a decree may be annulled for violating the Preamble, but a statute passed by Parliament may not.
Ordinances during the transitional period: a limit on applications for judicial review
Eky also challenged Article 136 of the Criminal Code, which stemmed from an ordinance dated December 23, 1958. On this point, the Conseil d’État declined to examine the application. The ordinance had been adopted under Article 92 of the Constitution during the transitional period between the Fourth and Fifth Republics.
The administrative court considers that the ordinance was adopted in the exercise of legislative power and therefore does not constitute an administrative act that may be challenged through an application for judicial review. This solution draws a clear line: the Conseil d’État reviews decrees, not acts of a legislative nature, even when they are issued by the government.
Comparison of the two joined applications
| Application | Contested text | Legal basis | Conseil d’État ruling |
|---|---|---|---|
| no. 46922 | Decree of December 23, 1958 (Articles R 30, R 31, R 32, R 33 of the Criminal Code) | Articles 34 and 37 of the Constitution, Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration | Dismissed on the merits: the decree does not violate the provisions cited |
| no. 46923 | Article 136 of the Criminal Code (ordinance of December 23, 1958) | Article 92 of the Constitution | Inadmissible: an act of a legislative nature, not subject to judicial review |
This table highlights the decision’s dual nature. The Conseil d’État agrees to review a regulatory act against constitutional rules, while declining jurisdiction over a legislative act.
The Eky judgment and the constitutional block: its scope and subsequent developments in administrative law
The Eky judgment stands at a crossroads in French public law. Its significance must be measured by what it does—and does not—do.
What it does:
- The 1958 Preamble becomes enforceable against administrative acts, expanding the body of law applied by administrative courts when reviewing decrees and orders
- The division of powers between statute and regulation established by Articles 34 and 37 of the Constitution applies directly in criminal law, including to repeal earlier conflicting provisions
- Ordinances adopted in the exercise of legislative power are not subject to review by administrative courts through an application for judicial review
What it does not do: Eky does not empower administrative courts to determine whether a statute complies with the Constitution. That jurisdiction remains outside the Conseil d’État’s remit. In 1971, the Constitutional Council relied on the Preamble to recognize freedom of association as a principle with constitutional status, broadening the review of statutes for constitutionality. These are distinct approaches.
Similarly, the question of whether a statute is compatible with an international treaty follows a separate path. In 1989, in the Nicolo judgment, the Conseil d’État agreed to review such compatibility even when the statute postdated the treaty. This is a review of treaty compliance, distinct from the review of constitutionality illustrated by Eky.

The tension between protecting fundamental rights and organizing the allocation of lawmaking powers remains the decision’s central theme. The Conseil d’État recognizes the 1789 Declaration as a standard of review, yet upholds an exception to the principle of legality in criminal law that it proclaims. The judgment does less to protect fundamental rights than to define the boundary between statute and regulation. This interpretation explains why the decision remains a starting point, rather than a culmination, in the development of French administrative law.



